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From the standpoint of the reli-
gious pacifist, Professor Zahn sees 
"elementary human rights" beginning 
at the "moment of conception mark-
ing the beginning of the individual's 
life process, " and argues against 
abortion from this point. 
A Religious Pacifist Looks at Abortion 
Gordon C. Zahn 
Prudence, if nothing else, wou ld 
seem to didate that a celibate male, 
especially one committed to pacifism, 
should avoid getting embroiled in 
con troversy with the women's I ibera-
tion crowd. Ordinarily I would be all 
set to go along with this and not on ly 
for reasons of such prudential re-
straint. I am in general agreement with 
the movement's object ives and prin-
ciples and more than ready to give it 
the benefit of almost every doubt -
even though I do wish at times that its 
principa l spokesmen (?) could be a 
litt le more, if not "ladylike," at least 
gentleman ly in their rhetoric and tone. 
But these are minor reservations. 
There is one point of substance, 
however, on which I must register 
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strong disagreement , and that is the 
increasing emphasis being placed on 
"free abortion on demand" as a 
principal plank in the liberationists' 
platform. From my perspective as a 
religious pacifist , I find this proposal 
thoroughly abhorrent; and I am 
disturbed by the willingness of so 
many who share my political and 
theological approach in most respects 
to go a long with or condone a practice 
which so clearly contradicts the values 
upon which that approach is based. 
In the past have criticized 
"establishment" Christians, in parti-
cular official Catholic ecclesiastical 
and theological spokesmen, for their 
hypersensitivity to the evil of killing 
the unborn and their almost total 
disregard of the evil of "post-natal" 
abortion in the form of the who lesale 
destruct ion of human life in war. The 
argument works both ways and with 
equal force: those of us who oppose 
war cannot be any less concerned 
abo ut the destruction of human life in 
the womb . 
In discussing this issue from a 
pacifist standpoin t [ do not intend to 
enter upon two controversies which, 
though clearly related to the problem 
of abortion, are somewhat peripheral 
to my essential concern for life and 
the reverence for life. Thus , the whole 
question of the morality of contra-
ception, obviously one of the alterna-
tives to abortion as a means of 
popula tion control, involves moral 
principles of an altogether different 
order. More closely related but also 
excluded from consideration here is 
the legal question , that is whether or 
not anti-abortion legislation now on 
the statute books should be repealed , 
modified , or retained. One can argue, 
as I shall here, that abortion is 
immoral and still recognize compelling 
248 
practical and theoretical reasons for 
not using state authority to impose a 
moral judgment that falls so far short 
of universal acceptance within the 
polical community . On the other 
hand, there are equally compelling 
arguments upholding legal prohibition 
of what has long been considered by 
many to be a form of murder; and this 
takes on added force to the extent 
that repeal of laws already in effect 
will be interpreted as official author-
ization of the hitherto forbidden 
practice. Since the in tention here is to 
discuss the objections to abortion 
itself, this very important legal ques-
tion will be left for others to debate 
and resolve. 
Nor will I comment upon what [ 
consider the tactical blunder on the 
part of the liberationists to "borrow 
trouble" by making so touchy an issue 
- on emotional as well as moral 
grounds - a central part of their 
program. I must , however, reject the 
rationale that is usually advanced to 
support their demands, the 'property 
rights" line which holds that because a 
woman's body is "her own ," she and 
she alone must be left free to decide 
what is to be done about the 
developing fetus. Leaving aside the 
obvious fact that the presence of the 
fetus suggests a decision that could 
have been made earlier, this line of 
argument represents a crude reversion 
to the model of laissez-faire economics 
Catholics of a liberal or radical 
persuasion have long since repudiated. 
Even if one were to accept the 
characterization of a woman's body as 
"property" (is it not one of the 
Iiberationists' complaints that men and 
man-made laws have reduced her to 
that status?) , the claim to absolute 
rights of use and disposal of that 
property could not be taken seriously. 
The owner of a badly needed residen-
tial building is not , or at least should 
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not be, free to evict his tenants to suit 
a selfish whim or to convert his 
property to some frivolous or non-
essentia l use. In such a case we would 
insist upon the traditional distinction 
which describes property as private in 
ownership but social in use. 
To use anot her example , the moral 
evil associated with prostitution does 
not lie solely, perhaps not even 
primarily, in the illicit sex relationship 
but, rather, in the degradation of a 
person to precisely this status of a 
"property" available for "use" on a 
rental or purchase basis . It is a tragic 
irony that the advocates of true and 
fu ll personhood for women have 
chosen to provide ideological justifica-
tion for attitudes which have inter-
fered with recognition of that person-
hood in the past. 
This is not to say , of course , th at a 
woman does not have prior rights over 
her own body but only that the 
exercise of those righ ts must take in to 
account the rights of others. In 
monogamous marriage this would 
preclude a wife's "freedom" to com-
mit adultery (a principle , it should be 
unnecessary to add, which applies to 
the husband as well) . Similarly, in the 
case of a pregnancy in wedlock, the 
husband's righ ts concerning the un-
born chi ld must be respected too ; 
indeed, even in a pregna ncy ou t of 
wedlock, the putative fa ther retains 
parental rights to the extent that he is 
ready to assume his share of respon-
sibility for the child's future needs. In 
both cases, and this is the crux of the 
argument, of course , the rights of the 
unborn child, perhaps the most impor-
tant claimant of all , must be respected 
and protected . 
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Human Rights 
These catego ries of rights, I insist, 
are not to be put in any "proper ty 
rights" or simi lar economic frame of 
reference. They represent elementary 
human rights arising out of an 
intimacy of union between responsible 
persons which transcends purely utili-
tarian or proprietary considerations. 
The governing consideration as far as 
the unborn chi ld is concerned is 
simply this : when do these rights come 
in to existence? The answer offered 
here, and I think it is the only answer 
compa tible wi th a pacifist commi t-
ment, is that they exist at the moment 
of conception marking the beginning 
of the individual's life processes. 
This has nothing to do with the old 
theological arguments over whether or 
not the soul can be said to be present 
at conception ; it rests completely 
upon the determination of whether or 
not there is now someth ing " living" in 
the sense that , given no induced or 
spon taneous in terferences , it wi ll de-
velop into a human person. We know 
for certain that this fertilized ovum is 
not going to develop in to a dog or cat 
or anything else: whatever its present 
or intervening states, it will at the end 
emerge as a human child. One need 
on ly consider the usual reaction to a 
spontaneous or accidental te rmin ation 
of a wanted pregnancy. The sorrow of 
the prospective paren ts, a sorrow 
shared by friends and relatives a like , 
testifies not only to the fact that 
something has "died" but, also , that 
this "someth ing" was human. 
So, too , with the medical argu-
ments over when the fetus becomes 
"viable" and , therefore, eligible for 
birth. It is the life that is present, not 
the organism , which should concern us 
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most. Once we agree that society's 
origin and purpose lie in the fulfill-
ment of human capacities and needs, 
we have established the basis for a 
reverence for life which goes far 
beyond such purely technical deter-
mination . Should a life once begun be 
terminated (whether before or after 
the point of viability) because the 
prospective mother did not have 
adequate food and care or because she 
was forced by the demands of her 
social or economic condition to 
undergo excessive physical or psycho-
logical strain , we would have no 
problem about charging society with a 
failure to meet its responsibility. There 
is no reason to change this judgmen t 
when the termination is brought about 
by deliberate act, either to avoid some 
personal inconvenience or to serve 
what may be rationalized into the 
"greater good" of the family unit or, 
as the eugenicist might put it, society 
as a whole. Just as rights begin with 
the beginning of the life process, so 
does society's obligation to protect 
them. 
Recently a new and somewhat 
terrifying "viability" test has been 
proposed in arguments supporting 
abortion. No longer is it to be the 
stage of physiological development 
which determines whether or not life 
is to be terminated but rather the 
degree to which "personhood" has 
emerged or developed. Although strict 
logic might suggest that personhood 
can be established only after the fetus 
has entered upon its extra-uterine 
existence (that is, after the child has 
been born) advocates of this new test 
are apparently willing to extend it 
back into the later weeks of pre-natal 
development as well. 
Two objections to this test should 
be immediately obvious . In the first 
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place (and the "generous allowance" 
of pre-natal personhood serves as a 
good illustration of this point), we are 
caught up with the same old problems 
of judgmen t tha t plagued the older 
viability standards: if the fetus is to be 
considered viable at x-weeks, what 
about the day before that period is 
completed? If personhood can be 
manifested in the pre-natal period 
when, let us say, fetuses can be 
compared in terms of differential 
activity, what about the hour before 
such differences can be noticed? Is 
more activity a sign that personhood is 
advanced, or migh t the absence of 
much activity be a sign of equal , 
though differen t, emergence of person-
hood? 
The second objection is even more 
troubling. Under the old notion of 
physiological viability, the child once 
born was unquestionably viable. The 
same may not be true - or may not 
remain so in the face of changing 
social definitions - once the emer-
gence or development of personhood 
is the measure. My experience as a 
conscientious objector in World War II 
doing alternate service in a home for 
mental deficients introduced me to 
literally hundreds of individuals whose 
state of retardation was such that they 
could be described as "animals" or 
even "vegetables" by members of the 
institu tional staff. Later, working in a 
hospital for mental diseases, I attended 
paretic and senile patients who had 
reached the state of regression and 
psychological deterioration at which 
the same terms could be applied to 
them and their behavior. However 
ardent and sincere the disclaimers may 
be, applying the test of personhood to 
the unborn is certain to open the way 
to pressures to apply that same test to 
the already born. In this sense, then, 
abortion and eu thanasia are ideological 
twins . 
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In the old theological formu lations 
of the problem, the condemnation of 
abortion was justified in terms of the 
"sanctity" or the "intrinsic worth" of 
human life . Today much of the 
argument supporting abortion rests 
upon similar abstractions applied now 
to the intrinsic worth of the prospec-
tive mother's life or of siblings whose 
living standards and life-chances might 
be threatened by the add i tional 
pregnancy . These are valid concerns 
and deserve serious and sympathetic 
understanding ; and society does have a 
responsibility to find answers to these 
problems that do not involve the 
sacrifice of the human life that has 
begun. Padfism and opposition to 
abortion converge here, for both find 
their ultimate justification in the 
Christian obligation to revere human 
life and its potential and to respect al l 
of the rights associated with it. 
The developmental model used by 
those who propose emergence of 
personhood as the test is basically 
sound, but as used by the advocates of 
abortion it becomes a logical enormity 
arguing for a development from an 
undefined or unstipulated beginning. 
A more consistent approach wou ld see 
human life as a continuity from the 
point of clinically determined con-
ception to the point of clinically 
determined death. This physiological 
life-span is then convertible to an 
existen tial framework as a develop-
mental pattern of dependence relation-
ships: at the earliest stages of a 
pregnancy the dependence is total ; as 
the fetus develops , it takes on some of 
its own functions; at birth , its bodily 
functions are physiologically inde-
pendent , but existential dependency is 
still the chi ld 's dominant condition. 
The rest of the pattern is obvious 
enough. As the individual mature s and 
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achieves the ful lness of personhood , 
both functional and behavioral inde-
pendence become dominant (though 
never total ; culture and its demands 
must be taken into account). Finally , 
advanced age and physical decline 
returns him to a state of dependency 
which may , at the end, approximate 
that of his earliest childhood. 
Society 's responsibilities to the 
individual stand in inverse relationship 
to the growth and decline of hi s 
independence and autonomy. It would 
follow, then , that the immorality of 
abortion (and euthanasia as well) lies 
precisely in the fact that they propose 
to terminate the li fe process when the 
dependency is most total , that it 
would do so with the approval or 
authorization of society , that it would 
seek to just ify this· betrayal of 
society's responsibility on purely prag-
matic grounds. The various claims 
made for the social utility of abortion 
(reduc ing the threa t of over-
population and now pollution ; sparing 
the already disadvantaged family the 
strain of providing for yet another 
mouth ; etc .) or the even less impres-
sive justifications in terms of personal 
and all too often selfi sh benefits to the 
prospective parent(s) have to be put in 
this context; and once they are, they 
lose much of their force. 
The earlier reference to the sorrow 
caused by the loss through mi scarri age 
of a wanted child does not obscure the 
fact that most abortion proposals are 
concerned with preventing the birth of 
unwanted children. No one will deny 
that being regarded as an unwan ted 
intruder in the family circle will be 
psychologically if not always physical-
ly harmful , but there should be ot her 
solutions to thi s problem than 
" sparing" the intruder this unpleasa nt-
ness by denying him life in the first 
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place. If a chi ld is "unwanted" before 
conception, science has provided suf-
ficient means for avoiding the begin-
ning of the li fe process. 
Since the sexual en lightenmen t 
burst upon us a generation o r so ago, 
we have replaced the old Victor ian 
notions about " the mystery of sex" 
with a kind of mechanistic assumption 
that man is the helpless victim of his 
chemistry and unconscious impulses, 
an assumption which reduces sexual 
intercourse to a direct , natural, and 
almost compulsive response to stimuli 
and situations. The other side of this 
particular co in is the not so hidden 
danger that man himse lf will be 
redefined in st rictly biological terms, a 
large ly accidenta l even t brough t in to 
being by the union of two adult 
organisms acting in response to the 
irre sistible urge. This is reflected in 
many of the statements made by 
advocates of abortion in their refer-
ences to the conceived chi ld a a 
"f ert il ized ovum." The term is per-
fectly accura te in the str ictly physio-
logical sense; in the Ch ri stian perspec-
tive, however, it leaves something to 
be desired. 
The act of intercourse , like any 
other human act, is and must remain 
subject to human responsibility. This 
means that those who enter upon it 
shou ld consider the possible conse-
quences of the act and acknowledge 
responsibility for those consequences 
if and when they come to pass. Ideally 
this would mean that unwanted 
chi ldren would not be conceived; 
where the ideal is not achieved - or 
where the participan ts change their 
minds after the child is conce ived - it 
will be society's obligations to assume 
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the responsibility for the new life that 
has been brought into being. 
Unwanted pregnancies resulting 
from a freely willed and voluntary act 
of sexual intercourse are one thing; 
those resulting from rape require 
spec ial consideration. Even here , I 
would hold , the reverence for life 
which forms the basis of this pacifist 
rejection of abortion would preclude 
the intentional termination of the life 
process begun under such tragic 
circumstances. The appa rent harshness 
of this position may be mitigated 
somewhat by reflecting that pregnan-
cies attributable to true rape (or 
i !lcest) represen t a small proportion of 
the unwanted. Certainly they do not 
constitute a large enough proportion 
to justify the emphasis placed upon 
them by proponents of abortion. This 
provides small consolation to the 
victim who has already undergone the 
physically and psychologically trau-
ma tic experience of the assault itself 
and must sti ll suffer the consequences 
of an act for which she bears no active 
responsibility. Neverthe less, the life 
that has begun is a human life and 
must be accorded the same rights and 
protection associated with the life 
resulting from normal and legitimate 
conceptions. Here again society must 
do what it can to provide all possible 
assistance to the victim including 
compensation (if one can speak of 
"compensat ion" in this context!) for 
the sacrifice she has been ca lled upon 
to make. In most cases we must 
assume the mother will not want to 
keep the child after birth, at which 
poin t society's responsibility for its 
future development will become com-
plete. I f a mother does decide to keep 
her child, society will sti ll have the 
ob ligation to make some continuing 
provision for adequate care and 
support. 
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The position I have ou tlined here 
has been described as unrealistic and 
even irresponsible in that it absolutizes 
the right of every "ferti lized ovum" to 
develop, as one critic put it , "in a 
planet which can no longer support 
that kind of reproduction and where it 
threatens the possibility of realizing 
the lives which exist." The adjec tives 
unrealist ic and irresponsible do not 
trouble me; they are fairly standard 
descriptions of the pacifist approach, 
and this is a pacifist case against 
abort ion. What does trouble me is the 
rest of the criticism. The ability or 
inability of the planet to support 
present and projected population 
totals is still a contested issue , and 
even if the prospects were as desperate 
as the statement suggests, the quest ion 
would still remain as to whether the 
termination of unborn life is a 
desirable or acceptab le solut ion. And 
as for the "realization" of the li fe 
which exists, it is essential to face the 
prior question of who is to determine 
what that involves and by what 
standards. How long, we must ask, 
before the quotas now being set in 
terms of "zero popula tion growt h" 
and similar quantitative formulae are 
refined by eugenic se lec tionists into 
qualitative quotas instead? This is not 
an idle fear. and one would think that 
a movement dedicated to the elimina-
tion of long-standing inequa lities based 
on the qualitative dist inction of sex 
should be particularly sensitive to the 
possibility. 
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Beyond th is there is that matter of 
"absolutizing" the right to life . and to 
this I am ready to plead guilty. At a 
time when moral absolutes of any kind 
are suspect and the fashions in theo-
logica l and ethica l discourse eem to 
have moved from si tuationa lism to 
relativism and now to something ap-
proximating indifferentism, it strikes 
me as not only proper but imperat ive 
that we proclaim the value of every 
human li fe as well as the obligation to 
respect that li fe wherever it exists - if 
not for what it is at any given moment 
(a newly fertilized ovum; a convicted 
criminal ; the habitual sinner) at least 
for what it may yet , with God's gracc, 
become. 
It is not just a matter of consis-
tency ; in a very real 'ense it is the 
choice between integrity and hypo-
crisy. No one who publicly mourns the 
senseles burning of a napalmed child 
should be indifferent to the inten-
tiona l killing of a living fetus in the 
womb. By the same token , the Ca th o-
lic, be he bishop or layma n, who 
somehow finds it possible to maintain 
an olympian si lence in the face of 
government policies which con tem-
plate the destruction of human life on 
a massive scale , has no right to issue 
indignant protests when the same basic 
disregard for human life is given ex-
pression in government policies per-
mit ting or encouraging abort ion. 
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